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INTERPRETING THE COURT INTERPRETERS ACT:
A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF
NON-ENGLISH SPEAKING CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
by JeffreyArcher Miller, JD 2010, AU WCL
I. Introduction
This article details the myriad of mine-
fields that attorneys face when they represent
non-English speakers, a segment of the United
States population that has been growing at
an exponential rate. Approximately 24.5 mil-
lion people in the United States speak English
less than "very well,"' which is an increase of
roughly 6.5 million people over a seven year
period.2 The need for qualified court interpret-
ers is following a similar upward trajectory.
Since fiscal year 2ooo, the number of federal
courtroom interpreting events has almost
doubled from 190,127 to 357,171.' Throughout
the 2010 fiscal year, the number of federal
court events requiring court interpretation
increased 3.8 percent.'
1 See Hyron B Shin & Robert A. Kominski, United
States Census Bureau, Language Use in the United States:
2007 at 3 (2010).
2 See Hyron B Shin & Robert A. Kominski, United
States Census Bureau, Comparison of the Estimates on Lan-
guage Use and English-Speaking Ability from the A CS, the
C2SS, and Census 2000 at 13 (2008) (observing that according
to the Census 2000 Supplemental Survey, approximately 19
million in the United States speak less than "very well").
3 Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Annual Report of the Di-
rector of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
13 (2000) (reporting 190,127 district court events using inter-
preters in fiscal year 2000 and 357,171 events in fiscal year
2010); see James C. Duff, Annual Report of the Director of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts 37 (2010).
4 See Annual Report of the Director of the Adminis-
trative Office of the United States Courts (2010). See gener-
ally, United States Bureau ofLabor Statistics Occupational
Outlook Handbook (2010-2011) (expecting employment in
interpretation and translation services to increase 22 percent
Courts, have struggled to come to
terms with non-English speakers' inability to
comprehend legal proceedings, which poses
a challenge to the delivery of justice. Unlike al-
legations of ineffective assistance of counsel,'
there is no well-established standard to deter-
mine the required effectiveness of courtroom
interpretation. The Supreme Court of the
United. States has never addressed when in-
terpreters must be provided, nor has it opined
on what quality of interpretation is required.
This article argues that the broad discretion
afforded to trial judges -paired with the ap-
parent willingness of appellate judges to place
their imprimatur on misguided interpreta-
tions of law-has seriously compromised the
legal rights of non-English speakers. Because
an appeal seeking reversal based on a fail-
ure to properly accommodate a non-English
speaker's communnication needs faces a steep
uphill battle, attorneys representing non-Eng-
lish speaking clients must not only be familiar
with relevant case law, but also firmly insist
that those rights be respected. It is important
that attorneys advocate for proper language
between 2008 and 2018-a much faster rate than average
employment growth).
5 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
6 See Michele LaVigne & McCay Vernon, An Inter-
preter Isn't Enough: Deafness, Language and Due Process,
2003 Wis. L. REV. 843, 889 (2003). This article addresses the
rights of non-hearing non-English speaking criminal defen-
dants. The rights of deaf and hard of hearing individuals who
use sign language would require an analysis of the Americans
with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, which are beyond the scope of the present article.
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accommodations from initial proceedings, as
attorneys are much more likely to succeed
if they make these demands for their clients
from the outset.
Part II of this article examines the cir-
cumstances inder which judges are required
to provide court-appointed interpreters. In a
significant number of cases, appellate courts
are extremely resistant to question a trial
judge's decision not to provide a courtroom
interpreter. As a practical matter, this means
that attorneys who represent clients with lim-
ited English skills must be pro-active in advo-
cating for their client's right to an interpreter.
If a judge does not appoint an interpreter
at trial, the attorney's chance of successfully
arguing on appeal that an adverse decision
should be reversed due to a linguistic impair-
ment is close to nil. Part III explores issues
that may arise when more than one participant
in a court proceeding requires an interpreter.
Here too, the case law (outside of California)
strongly suggests that a trial judge's decision is
unlikely to be overturned on appeal. Accord-
ingly, an attorney must be prepared to explain
to the trial judge why his client is entitled
to his own interpreter throughout the trial. A
post-trial appeal on these grounds is unlikely
to succeed. Part IV explores issues relating to
courtroom imterpreting errors: how to identify
them, how to challenge them in a timely fash-
ion, and how to prevent them from happening.
II. The Non-English Speaker's Quasi-Right
to a Court-Appointed Interpreter
The Supreme Court first discussed
the right to a court-appointed interpreter in
the 190) decision, Perovich v. UnitedStates,7
in which the defendant was found guilty of
first-degree murder. In an opinion that fo-
cused mainly on unrelated matters, the Su-
preme Court briefly addressed the absence of
an interpreter during trial. The Court's entire
analysis of the issue is reproduced below:
7 See Perovich v. United States, 205 U.S. 86, 92
(1907).
One [assignment of error] is that the
court erred in refusing to appoint an
interpreter when the defendant was
testifying. This is a matter resting
largely in the discretion of the trial
court, and it does not appear frorn
the answers made bv the witness
that there was any abuse of such dis-
cretion. 8
These two sentences have had an enor-
mous impact on the non-English speaker's
ability to receive court-appointed interpret-
ing assistance. The Perocich approach, which
provides the trial judge with broad discretion
to determine whether a court-appointed inter-
preter is necessary, has been cited in slate and
federal courts for over a century and contin-
nes to be cited today.9
Following the Perovich decision, lower
courts gradually acknowledged that the in-
ability of a criminal defendant to comprehend
court proceedings due to a linguistic impair-
ment may violate the Sixth Amendment.
Specifically, if a defendant is unable to under-
stand a witness's testimony, his or her right
to confrontation and cross-examination may
be severely curtailed.o For example, in 19 7 0,
the Second Circuit held for the first time in
UnitedStates ex rel. Negron . State" that the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amend-
ment, which applies to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause,
requires that non-English speakers be noti-
fied that they have a right to simultaneous
interpretation at the Government's expense.
The tension between. the Perovich holding,
8 See id. at 91.
9 See Mollie M. Pawlowky, Note, When Justice is Lost
in "Translation:" Gonzalez v. United States, an "Interpreta-
tion" of the Court Interpreters Act of 1978, 45 DEPAUL L. REv.
435, 440 (1996).
10 United States v. Carrion, 488 F.2d 12, 14 (1st Cir.
1973); see Gonzalez v. Virgin Islands, 109 F.2d 215, 217 (3d
Cir. 1940).
11 See United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434
F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1970) (finding that a defendant who does not
speak English and is denied a court interpreter is placed in a
similar situation to a defendant who is not present at his own
trial).
12 See id. at 391.
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which provides wide discretion to the trial
court judge to determine whether a court-
appointed interpreter is required, and the
Negron holding, which suggests that the failure
to provide an interpreter in criminal proceed-
ings may violate the Constitution, are mutually
exclusive and require a more exacting level of
judicial review. This inconsistency on the is-
sue of an interpreter, however, has never been
resolved."
Following Negron, in 1978, Congress
passed the Court Interpreters Act." The
legislative history of the Act expressed con-
cerns that several federal convictions were
reversed on due process grounds when an
interpreter was not appointed." Though the
act has subsequently been clarified through
judicial interpretation, the initial version did
not require interpreter certification. This was
problematic as the courts' only basis for evalu-
ating the quality of the interpreters' skills were
the interpreters' own averments.' The lack of
quality control led to serious communication
problems. For example, in the infamous case
of Virginia c Edmonds, in which a deaf woman
had been raped, the court interpreter improp-
erly conveyed the victim's characterization of
the event as "made love" rather than "forced
intercourse."'7
The main stated purpose of the Court
Interpreters Act is to provide interpreting
services sufficient to permit a non-English
speaking party to comprehend court proceed-
ings and to communicate with counsel or the
presiding judicial officer.'" The Act requires
that a certified court interpreter be used un-
less one is not "reasonably available," in which
case, an "otherwise competent" interpreter
may be used.'9 A review of the case law per-
taining to the Act suggests that the legislation
has not been as effective as its drafters had
13 See Pawlowky, supra note 9, at 442.
14 See 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d)(1)(1988).
15 See 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4652, 4654.
16 See id. at 4655.
17 See id. at 4654.
18 See § 1827(d)(1).
19 See id.
hoped.
1. Judicial Interpretation of the Court
Interpreters Act
The first case to interpret the Court
Interpreters Act, United States . apia20 had a
profound effect on the case law pertaining to
non-English speakers. In Tapia, the Fifth Cir-
cuit determined, consistent with Perovich, (I)
that the decision whether to provide a court-
appointed interpreter rests within the broad
discretion of the trial court, (2) that there is
no constitutional right to a court-appointed
interpreter, and (3) that the need for an inter-
preter is a question of fact.21 The Fifth Circuit
explained that the district court has a duty to
inquire whether a defendant's ability to com-
prehend the proceedings and communication
with his counsel would be inhibited without
the assistance of an interpreter. 9 The ques-
tion of whether or not a failure to provide
an interpreter was an error is whether or
not "such failure made the trial fundamen-
tally unfair."' In United States v Johnson, 2
the Seventh Circuit elaborated on the hold.-
ing in Tapia, finding that a defendant is only
entitled to a court-appointed interpreter if
the district court judge determines that the
defendant (I) speaks only or primarily a lan-
guage other than English and (2) his inability
to speak English inhibits his ability to com-
prehend the proceedings or communicate
with counsel.'. However, not all circuits have
retained the factual inquiry requirement. In
United States ePerez, the Fifth Circuit found
that the trial judge need not engage in a fac-
tual inquiry as to whether the criminal defen-
dant properly understands court proceedings
if the defendant does not make an affirmative
20 United States v. Tapia, 631 F.2d 1207, 1209 (5th Cir.
1980).
21 See id. at 1209.
22 See id.
23 See id. at 1210.
24 United States v. Johnson, 248 F.3d 655 (7th Cir.
2001).
25 See id. at 661.
26 United States v. Perez, 918 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1990).
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assertion that he does not understand .2 A trial
judge's decision to refuse to provide an inter-
preter over counsel's objection during trial
is subject to abuse of discretion review.28 If
counsel waits until after the trial to raise the
issue, the reviewing court examines the record
under the plain error standard.9 In order to
overcome plain error review, the moving party
must prove that the district court ruling is (i)
an error, (2) which is plain, i.e. clear under the
current law, and (3) which affects the defen-
dant's substantial rights.so
At least four arguments in support of
the current standard of review can be dis-
tilled from the case law. The first, as noted in
Nuguid" and its progeny, is that the ordinary
rules of evidence require counsel to make a
timely objection. If no objection is made on
27 See id. at 490-91.
28 See United States v. Salehi, 187 F. App'x 157, 168
(3rd Cir. June 28, 2006) (finding that district courts are afford-
ed discretion in implementing the Court Interpreters Act and
no abuse of discretion had taken place); see also United States
v. Lim, 794 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding the district
court did not abuse its discretion); see also United States v.
Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324, 1337 (11th Cir. 2007) (reviewing
failure of trial court to provide an interpreter under abuse of
discretion standard).
29 See United States v. Sandoval, 347 F.3d 627, 632
(7th Cir. 2003) (finding objections made during trial are
reviewed under abuse of discretion and under plain error when
defendant fails to object during trial); see also United States
v. Hasan, 526 F.3d 653, 660-61 (10th Cir. 2008) (explaining
that a district court's denial of a motion will be evaluated for
abuse of discretion but when a party fails to raise an issue
before the district court, it is reviewed under plain error); see
also United States v. Arthurs, 73 F.3d 444, 447 (1st Cir. 1996)
(reviewing under plain error); see also United States v. Huang,
960 F.2d 1128, 1135-36 (2d Cir. 1992) (providing summaries
rather than word-for-word interpretation is not plain error); see
also United States v. Amador, No. 05-4934, 2007 WL 162783
at *2 (4th Cir. Jan. 19, 2007) (reviewing under plain error);
see also United States v. Paz, 981 F.2d 199, 201 (5th Cir.
1992) (reviewing under plain error); see also United States
v. Markarian, 967 F.2d 1098, 1104 (6th Cir. 1992) (determin-
ing that the trial court did not commit plain error in failing
to provide an interpreter on its own motion); see also United
States v. Gonzales, 339 F.3d 725, 728 (8th Cir. 2003) (review-
ing under plain error).
30 See, e.g., Gonzales, 339 F.3d at 728.
31 People of Territory of Guam v. Nuguid, No. CRIM.
89-00073A, 1991 WL 336901 (D. Guam App. Div. 1991)
aff'd, 959 F.2d 241 (9th Cir. 1992).
the record, the objection is waived, and cannot
be overturned on appeal unless it can survive
plain error review.12 The second argument is
that the trial judge is in the best position to
evaluate the language ability of the defendant.
This view is expressed in one of the earli-
est cases to interpret the Act, UnitedStates v.
Coronel- Quintana. " In Coronel- Quintana, the
Eight Circuit held that "[b]ecause the deci-
sion to appoint an interpreter will likely hinge
upon a variety of factors, including the defen-
dant's understanding of the English language,
and the complexity of the proceedings, issues,
and testimony, the trial court, being in direct
contact with the defendant, should be given
wide discretion . . . ."", The third argument in
favor of a heightened standard of review is
that a less deferential standard would provide
an unfair windfall for defendants. The most
frequently cited expression of this concern is
found in Valladares . United States," in which
the court stated, "To allow a defendant to
remain silent throughout the trial and then,
upon being found guilty, to assert a claim of
inadequate translation would be an open invi-
tation to abuse."" The fourth argument, also
raised in Valladeres, is the need to "balance the
rights to confrontation and effective assistance
against the public's interest in the economical
administration of criminal law . . . ."
Of the more than 90 cases that have
interpreted the Act since 197 8 , reversal is
exceedingly rare." Cases in which federal
appellate judges have upheld district court
decisions despite serious misgivings about the
trial courts' conduct are far more common.
32 See Debra L. Hovland, Errors in Interpretation: Why
Plain Error is not Plain, 11 Law & Ineq. 473, 489 (1993).
33 United States v. Coronel-Quintana,752 F.2d 1284 (8th
Cir. 1985).
34 See id. at 1291.
35 Valladares v. United States, 871 F.2d 1564 (11th Cir.
1989).
36 See id. at 1566.
37 See id.
38 See Claudia G. Catalano, Annotation, Construction
and Application of Court Interpreters Act, 28 U.S. C.A. §§
1827, 1828, 40 A.L.R. FED. 2d 115 (2009) (listing all cases
citing to the Court Interpreters Act).
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For instance, in Yaohan USA. Corp. v. NLB,9
the Ninth Circuit observed that although the
defendant's answers were "sometimes stum-
bling and ungrammatical" and that it did "not
approve of the ALJ's handling of the witness's
months.45 On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the
court admitted that it was "not unsympathetic
to the legitimate concerns raised by Juarez-
Duarte that imposing the obstruction en-
hancement on defendants who falsely assert
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE PREVENTS TRYING CRIMNAL DEFENDANTS
WHO LACK THE CAPACTY TO UNDERSTAND CR`MNAL PROCEEDINGS:
THIS PROHIBI ION HLDS FOR INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE HINDERED BY
LINGUISTIC BARRIERS AS WELL AS MENTAL MPAIRMENTS
language difficulties," it would not disturb the
lower court's decision to deny the defendant's
request for an interpreter.40
United States . Juarez-Duarte/ provides
another example in which a federal court of
appeals reluctantly permitted a district court
decision to refuse to provide an interpreter to
stand. The defendant in Juarez-Duarte asked
for an interpreter during his sentencing hear-
ing, claiming that he did not understand fully
what had happened during an earlier appear-
ance., The district court observed that the de-
fendant had not asked for an interpreter at his
detention hearing or at his prior arraignments,
and that he appeared to understand English
well enough when he entered his guilty plea.
The district court agreed to set aside the plea,
but warned, "an improper request could have
an effect on his sentencing."-' On the defen-
dant's third arraignment, the district court
made good on its threat, recommending a two-
level enhancement for obstruction of justice
for "providing materially false information to a
judge regarding his need for an interpreter." 4
The decision increased the defendant's sen-
tence range from 46-57 months to 78-97
39 Yaohan U.S.A. Corp. v. NLRB, Nos. 95-70818, 95-
70913, 1997 WL 453688 (9th Cir. June 30, 1997).
40 Id at *2.
41 United States v. Juarez-Duarte, 513 F.3d 204 (5th Cir.
2008).
42 See id. at 207.
43 See id.
44 See id. at 208.
the need for an interpreter might make other
defendants hesitant to request an interpreter,
a right protected by the Court Interpreters
Act . . . ."46 Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit felt
compelled to affirm the district court's ruling.47
2. Criticisms of the Case Law
The current standards of review gov-
erning the provision of court interpreting
have been heavily criticized. One of the most
sophisticated arguments is that they rest on
an improper reading of the Court Interpret-
ers Act itself. The Ninth Circuit in Gonzalez
c. United States' upheld the district court's
determination that the defendant did not need
an interpreter. In Gonzalez, the district court
noted that "there is some language difficulty
but not a major one," and the majority of the
Ninth circuit found that '[t]he defendant's
answers were consistently responsive, if brief
and somewhat inarticulate, and he only occa-
sionally consulted his attorney."49 In his dis-
sent, Judge Reinhardt argued that the statu-
tory language and legislative history did not
support the district court's narrow application
of the Act. Judge Reinhardt first analyzed the
plain language of the statute, noting that ab-
sent evidence to the contrary, the court must
45 See id.
46 See id. at 211.
47 See id.
48 Gonzalez v. United States, 33 F.3d 1047, 1052-54
(9th Cir. 1994) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
49 See id. at 1050-51.
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follow its common, everyday meaning.o The
Act provides that the presiding judicial ofer error, but (e noco review."
S- -- ----Ii~ -
-- Several scholars have subsequently
shall utilize the services of the most picked up Judge Reinhardt's "de novo" flag
available certified interpreter ... if and attempted to carry it further.51 Most re-
the presiding judicial officer deter- cently, Chao has advocated for a more nu-
mines on such officer's own motion anced approach, in which appellate courts
or on the motion of a party that suchor o th moionof apary tat uchexamine district court factual findings under
party ... speaks only or primarily a
language other than the English lan-of review but examinelguage .ohas toa the gitsh an-' matters of statutory construction under decguage ... so as to inhibit such party's
comprehension of the proceedings noco review. This approach is similar to the
or communication with counsel or approach that the judiciary has taken to sen-
the presiding judicial officer." tencing guidelines, federal statutes of limita-
tions, the Speedy Trial Nct, and the Juv enile
Citing the Random House Dictionary of Delinquency Act. I In Chao's view the ques-
the English Language,up Judge Reinhardt con- tion of whether a defendant is entitled to an
T IS NOT ONLY CONSTIUONALLY ESSENTIAL BUT ALSO EMINENTLY REASONABLE TO
REOLRE THE APPOINTMENT OF A SEPARATE INTERPRETER TO FACILITATE COMMUNICATION
BETWEEN A DEFENDANT AND HIS COUNSEL "THROUGHOUT~ THE PROSEEDINGS" AND NOT TO
PERMIT THE DEFENSE INTERPRETER TO PERFORM AN ADDITIONAL ROLE OF INTERPRETINO
WITNESSES' TESTIMONY FOR THE COURT
eluded that the common meaning of "inhibit"
is "hinder." Furthermore, the language "shall"
clearly indicates that the Act is nondiscretion-
ary.5" A judicial officer "must" appoint an inter-
preter when a defendant's language skills are
sufficiently deficient to trigger the Act. Judge
Reinhardt found further support for his view
in the Act's House Report, quoting Congress-
man Fred Richmond's statement before the
subcommittee that " [i]f language -handicapped
Americans are not given the constitutionally-
established access to understand and partici-
pate in their own defense, then we have failed
to carry out a fundamental premise of fairness
and due process for all."5 Judge Reinhardt
concluded that the proper standard of review
under these circumstances should not be clear
50 See id. at 1053.
51 See id. (emphasis added).
52 Random House Dictionary of the English Language,
732 (1979).
53 See Gonzales, 33 F.3d at 1053.
54 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4652, 4654.
interpreter under the Court Interpreters Act
is a mixed question of law and fact. The dis-
trict court judge's interpretation of "inhibit"
and how the judge applies that legal standard
to the facts of the case should be reviewed de
noeo.:
55 See Gonzalez, 33 F.3d at 1053 (Reinhardt, J., dissent-
ing).
56 See e.g., Mollie M. Pawlowky, Note, When Justice is
Lost in "Translation: " Gonzalez v. United States, an "Inter-
pretation" of the Court Interpreters Act of 1978, 45 DE PAUL
L. REV. 435, 488 (1996); Leslie V. Dery, Amadou Diallo and
the "Foreigner" Meme: Interpreting the Application ofFed-
eral Court Interpreter Laws, 53 FLA. L. REV. 239, 288 (2001);
Cassandra L. McKeown & Michael G. Miller, Say What?
South Dakota ' Unsettling Indifference to Linguistic Minori-
ties in the Courtroom, 54 S.D. L. REV. 33, 69 (2009).
57 See David H. Chao, Bifurcated Review ofInterpreter
Determinations Under the Court Interpreters Act, 10 CoNN.
PUBLIC INTEREST L. J. 139, 171-72 (2010).
58 See id
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3. Recommendations lor the Practicing
Attorney
Effective representation of a non-Eng-
lish speaking client begins with recognizing
that the trial judge's power to appoint-or
refuse to appoint-a courtroom interpreter
is very unlikely to be overturned. To improve
the likelihood of receiving a court-appointed
interpreter, an attorney who represents a cli-
ent in federal court who does not speak Eng-
lish fluently should inform the court of any
linguistic deficiencies that her client may have
as soon as possible. Under no circumstances
should an attorney rely on the trial judge to
make a sua sponte inquiry into her client's lan-
guage skills. Nor should the attorney assume
that if a client does not ask for an interpreter
then he does not need one. The frequency
with which defendants are denied meaning-
ful access to the courts merely because they
are unaware of their rights -and their at-
torneys fail to assert their rights -is grist for
grim speculation. Th.e seminal case of Negron
provides a particularly apt description of how
fallacious reliance on the client may be:
For all that appears, Negron, who was
clearly unaccustomed to asserting
'personal rights' against the author-
ity of the judicial arm of the state,
may well not have had the slightest
notion that he had any 'rights' or
any 'privilege' to assert them. At the
hearing before Judge Bartels, Ne-
gron testified: 'I knew that I would
have liked to know what was hap-
pening but I did not know that they
were supposed to tell me.'"
Defense counsel should be prepared to
argue that the failure to provide an interpreter
violates her client's Sixth Amendment rights.
The Sixth Amendment ensures the right to
be meaningfully present at one's own trial, to
assist in one's own defense, to have effective
assistance of counsel, and to confront op-
59 See United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434
F.2d 386, 390 (2d Cir. 1970).
posing witness on cross examination." To be
"present" means more than physical presence;
it means that a defendant has "sufficient pres-
ent ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding."6
The Due Process Clause prevents trying
criminal defendants who lack the capacity to
understand criminal proceedings;6 2 this prohi-
bition holds for individuals who are hindered
by linguistic barriers as well as mental impair-
ments.
The unfortunate reality is that if coun-
sel fails to convince the trial court that an
interpreter is required early on in the process,
the odds of reversal on appeal are exceedingly
low. Appellate courts have uniformly demon-
strated a very strong dedication to upholding
trial courts' decisions regarding the provi-
sion of interpreting services. Even if defense
counsel loses the argument at the trial level
and has no choice but to seek reversal on
appeal, it is still worthwhile to raise the need
for an interpreter as early as possible. At the
very least, counsel will be able to point to a
detailed record regarding her efforts to secure
the appropriate services for her client.
III. The Controversial Question of Whether
a Non-English Speaker Has a Right to His
Own Court-Appointed Interpreter.
Lawyers often incorrectly assume that
obtaining an interpreter for their client for
courtroom proceedings is sufficient to ensure
that their client receives a fair trial. The courts
employ interpreters to perform several dif-
ferent functions, and when an interpreter is
asked to perform too many functions at the
same time, the attorney's ability to represent
his client is invariably compromised.64 The
60 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also United States v.
Mosquera, 816 F.Supp. 168, 172 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
61 See Negron, 434 F.2d 389 (quoting Dusky v. United
States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960)).
62 See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975); see also
Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
63 See Negron, 434 F.2d at 390-91.
64 The various functions include: interpreting all
remarks in open court (proceedings interpreting), interpreting
privileged communications in and out of court between coun-
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problems that can arise are illustrated in the
following hypotheticals. For the sake of sim-
plicity, assume that all of the non-English
speakers described below communicate flu-
ently in Spanish, but do not understand
English:
Example A The Basic Case: The court
appoints an interpreter because you have a
non-English speaking client. Your client is
the only Spanish speaker participating in the
trial. Your client chooses not to testify. The
interpreter sits between you and your client
and performs two functions: he interprets the
trial testimony for your client and facilitates
communication between you and your client
in and out of the -
courtroom.
Example
B -The Case of
Interpreter Bor-
rowing: The court
appoints an in-
terpreter because
you have a non-
English speaking
client. This time,
however, your
client is not the
only non-English
speaker to participate in the proceedings. The
prosecution's star witness is also a Spanish
speaker. For most of the trial, your interpreter
performs the same functions as in Example A.
He sits between you and your client; he inter-
prets the trial testimony for your client and
enables you to communicate effectively with
your client during the course of the trial. But
when the time comes for the prosecution's
witness to testify, the judge orders the inter-
preter to leave the trial table, stand next to the
prosecution's witness, and interpreter the wit-
sel and the client (defense interpreting or table interpreting),
and interpreting all non-English witness testimony (witness
interpreting). Mathers, 1324 n. 33; see also Graham J. Steele,
Court Interpreters in Canadian Criminal Law, 34 Crim. Law.
Quarterly 218 (1991); Williamson B. C. Chang & Manuel U.
Araujo, Interpreters for the Defense: Due Process for the Non-
English-Speaking Defendant, 63 Cal. L. Rev. 801-23 (1975).
ness' testimony into English for the benefit of
the jury. You and your client have no means of
communicating with each other while the wit-
ness is testifying. When the witness is excused,
the interpreter returns to his seat between you
and your client at the trial table.
Example C- The Case ofiiultzple De-
fendants: The court appoints an interpreter
because there are three non-English speak-
ing defendants in the case. Each non-English
speaking defendant is represented by a dif-
ferent attorney. The court provides the de-
fendants with headphones and instructs the
interpreter to speak into a microphone. By
listening to the interpreter's simultaneous
interpretation, the
defendants are able to
follow the proceedings
in Spanish. However,
the defendants have no
means of communicat-
ing with their attorneys
while the proceedings
are taking place.
The scenarios
described above, and
variations on them,
have been the sub-
ject of litigation for
decades. There is a line of cases that strongly
condemns the practices of "borrowing" the de-
fense's interpreter for witness testimony (as in
ExampleB) or "sharing" a defense interpreter
in a multi-defendant case (as in Example C).
However, these cases may only be useful for
attorneys who practice in California state
court.
In Calfornia . Carreon,66 a Spanish-
speaking defendant was convicted of robbery
and kidnapping. On appeal, the defendant
alleged that the trial and hearing courts erred
in appointing only one interpreter to assist the
defendant in conferring with defense counsel
and to interpret a Spanish-speaking witness'
65 California v. Carreon, 151 Cal. App.3d 559, 565
(1994).
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testimony" (in other words, Example B, supra.).
The court found and agreed "that a separate
interpreter should have been present through-
out the proceedings to simultaneously trans-
late all spoken English words and to facilitate
communication between the defendant and
ATTORNEYS SHOULD BE FAMLJAR WITH
TH ITFALLS THAT SHAR:W' OR
[BORROWING" INTERPRETERS F7OR COURT
PROCEEDNGS POSE AND SHOULD BE
PREPARED TO EXPLAIN TO THE TRIAL
COURT WHY AND HOW THIS PRACTICE
PREJUDICES THER CLENTS' RGHTS.
his non-Spanish speaking attorney." , In sup-
port of its holding, the Court of Appeals of
California observed that Article I, section 14
of the California Constitution provides that
"[a] person unable to understand English who
is charged with a crime has a right to an in-
terpreter throughout the proceedings." 8 The
court cited with approval the Second Circuit's
analysis in Negron, which concluded that the
failure to provide "interpreter services impairs
not only the defendant's due process rights,
but also his right to confront adverse witness-
es, to the effective assistance of counsel, and
to be present at his own trial."69 The court also
quoted at length a District Court of Pennsylva-
nia's opinion, which stated, expressly in dicta,
that two interpreters may be constitutionally
necessary if a Spanish-speaking witness tes-
tifies during the trial of a Spanish-speaking
defendant.7o The court then provided what
may still be the most cogent argument in favor
of providing a defendant with his own inter-
preter throughout a criminal trial:
66 Id. at 555-56.
67 Id. at 566.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 566.
70 Id., citing United States ex ret. Navarro v. Johnson,
365 F. Supp. 676, (E.D. Pa. 1973).
It is not only constitutionally es-
sential but also eminently reason-
able to require the appointment of
a separate interpreter to facilitate
communication between a defen-
dant and his counsel "throughout
the proceedings" and not to permit
the defense interpreter to perform
an additional role of interpreting
witnesses' testimony for the court.
The present case illustrates the
point. When the Spanish-speaking
victim was testifying, the interpreter
was chiefly concerned with translat-
ing his testimony for the court and
was not readily available to facilitate
consultation between defendant and
his counsel. It is true that if defense
counsel and defendant wanted to
consult one another, they could in-
dicate their desire to do so and the
interpreter would be made available
to them, thereby interrupting the
proceeding. Such an arrangement
would significantly inhibit attorney-
client communication. Simply put,
it would require the defendant, in
order to accomplish the otherwise
simple task of consulting his coun-
sel, to somehow make his intention
known to the court and call the in.-
terpreter back to the counsel table.
During the attorney-client conversa-
tion, attention undoubtedly would
focus upon the scene at the counsel
table, as occurs when counsel ap-
proach the bench for a private con-
sultation with the court.
For defense counsel's part, the risk
of alienating or antagonizing the jury
or bench would infuse the mere act
of speaking to his client with con-
siderations of strategy and tactics, in
contrast to the English-speaking de-
fendant whose consultation would
be unobtrusive and likely to go un-
noticed. Communication between
counsel and defendant should not
be hampered by such concerns, nor
should the exercise of a constitu-
tional right depend upon whether
the defendant is assertive enough to
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bring attention to himself.
Carreon raised serious doubts if it
would ever be possible to "borrow" a defen-
dant's interpreter while a non-English speak-
ing witness testified without violating the de-
fendant's constitutional rights.:' In California
C. Rioz,7 the Court of Appeals of California ef-
fectively foreclosed the "sharing" of interpret-
ers in a multi-defendant case as well (in other
words, Example C, supra.). In Rioz, the defen-
dant was required to share one interpreter
with three other co-defendants.3 While taking
care to stress that the court was not creating a
per se rule that an individual interpreter must
be provided for each co-defendant in a multi-
defendant case, the court reversed judgment
against the defendant. The court held that "in
any proceedings at which witnesses are called
and testimony taken, the fundamental rights
of a defendant to understand the proceedings
being taken against him and to immediately
communicate with counsel when the need
arises require that each non-English-speaking
defendant be afforded an individual interpret-
er throughout the proceedings."74
Finally, in California c. Resendesj the
California's Supreme Court weighed in on a
procedure that has become a common and
perfectly acceptable practice in federal court.
In Resendes, two Spanish-speaking defendants
shared a single interpreter. The judge devised
a procedure whereby the defendant could
raise his hand when he wanted to stop the
proceedings, at which point the defendant
would be permitted to have a private conver-
sation with his attorney with the assistance of
the court interpreter.' The State attempted to
71 Id at. 570-71. See also California v. Aguilar, 667
P. 2d 1198 (Cal. 1984) (reversing the conviction of a non-
English speaking defendant because a second court-appointed
interpreter was required); California v. Menchaca, 146 Cal.
App. 3d 1019 (1983) ("In our view, nothing short of a sworn
interpreter at defendant's elbow will suffice.").
72 California v. Rioz, 146 Cal. App. 3d 905 (1984).
73 Id. at 910.
74 Id at 913.
75 California v. Resendes, 164 Cal.App.3d 812 (1985).
76 Id.
persuade the court that Resendes was distin-
guishable from Carreon because the trial court
judge had created a specific procedure to ad-
dress the problem of the defendant communi-
cating with counsel. 7 The court did not agree:
Even though the judge sanctions an
interruption procedure and so in-
forms the j ury - - which apparently he
did not do here -- a defendant must
affirmatively interrupt proceedings
each and every time he wants to in-
voke his constitutional righit to com-
municate with counsel. Invocation
of such a right should not be held
hostage to a lingering fear that a jury
wholly or mainly composed of nono -
lingual English-speaking persons
may view the non-English-speaking
defendant as an obstructionist or at
least a minor irritant.7"
The Carreon-Rioz-Resendes trilogy and
their companion cases 9 created robust protec-
tions for criminal defendants in state courts in
California. During the early I98os, the Court
of Appeals of California repeatedly sided with
non-English speaking defendants who ob-
jected to the practice of interpreter borrowing
and interpreter sharing. Although the Court
of Appeals cited frequently to the California's
state constitution as the basis for its decision,
it also drew upon federal court cases penned
in the 1970s and quoted liberally from a 1975
law review article that argued that a criminal
defendant should be provided with his own
"defense interpreter" throughout the duration
of his trial."o
Now, almost thirty years later, it appears
safe to conclude that these cases have had prac-
77 Id.
78 Id. at 612.
79 See California v. Aguilar, 667 P. 2d 1198 (Cal. 1984)
(reversing the conviction of a non-English speaking defendant
because a second court-appointed interpreter was required);
see also California v. Menchaca, 184 Cal. Rptr. 691 (1983)
("In our view, nothing short of a sworn interpreter at defen-
dant's elbow will suffice.").
80 Williamson B. C. Chang & Manuel U. Araujo, In-
terpreters for the Defense: Due Process for the Non-English-
Speaking Defendant, 63 Cal. L. Rev. 801-23 (1975).
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tically no influence on the trajectory of federal
court interpreting case law. Rightly or wrongly,
federal courts have construed the rights of non-
English speakers to courtroom interpreters in a
much narrower fashion. In UnitedStates .Lim,"
a judge sitting on the United States District for
the Southern District of California "borrowed"
an interpreter from the defense table to assist
a witness and at times provided only one inter-
preter for two non-English speaking co-defen-
dants.82 The Ninth Circuit ruled that without a
showing that the defendant's ability to under-
stand the proceedings or communicate with
counsel was impaired, the "use of interpreters
in the courtroom is a matter within the discre-
tion of the district court."" And that the trial
judge's actions did not constitute an abuse of
discretion.a, Shortly thereafter, the Eleventh
Circuit published United States e. Bennett. 5 The
Bennett court encountered a fact pattern that
the federal courts have faced repeatedly in the
ensuing years. In Bennett, the trial court ap-
pointed one interpreter to interpret for three
non-English speaking co-defendants. Two of
the defendants argued on appeal that the trial
court's failure to appoint one interpreter for
each defendant violated their rights under the
Court Interpreters Act and the Sixth Amend.-
ment.8 7 The Bennett Court found that the Court
Interpreters Act "clearly authorizes the use of a
single interpreter in multi-defendant cases"."
The Bennett Court holdings have been reaf-
firmed repeatedly. With each successive court
decision that cited with approval to Bennett, its
holdings became more difficult to successfully
challenge. Hence, when the Sixth Circuit took
up the same issues in United States . Sanchez,89
the path had already been thoroughly blazed.
81 United States v. Lim, 794 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1986).
82 Id.
83 Id. at 471 (quoting United States v. Coronel-Quin-
tana, 752 F. 2d 1284, 1291 (9th Cir. 1985)).
84 Id.
85 United States v. Bennett, 848 F.2d 1134 (11th Cir.
1988).
86 Id. at 1140.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 United States v. Sanchez, 928 F.2d 1450 (6th Cir.
1991).
The court noted, "Every circuit which has ad-
dressed this issue has concluded that the Act
does not require every defendant in multi-de-
fendant cases be provided with his own per-
sonal interpreter."o
Part IV: Courtroom Interpreting Errors
In many instances securing a court-
appointed interpreter is not the final, but
rather the first step in ensuring that the non-
English speaker receive treatment equal to his
English-speaking peers. Although there are
good reasons to supply each defendant with
his own interpreter, these arguments have en-
countered a skeptical audience outside of the
California state court system. In Part IV, we
touch on another substantial barrier to effec-
tive legal representation, even when court-ap-
pointed interpreters are provided: courtroom
mnterpreter error.
The attorney who wants to provide
evidence on appeal that the court interpreter's
performance fell below an acceptable standard
is in an exceptionally difficult position. First,
unless the court has agreed to provide the
defendant with his own interpreter, the defen-
dant and his attorney have no way of knowing
if the interpreter is correctly interpreting the
testimony. Second, appellate courts are clearly
disinclined to find that courtroom interpreter
errors equate to more than harmless error.
The current state of affairs is particularly dis-
concerting because there is reason to believe
that courtroom interpreting errors are quite
common.
1. Contemporaneous Objections
The evidentiary rule that objections
must be contemporaneous to overcome plain
error review is particularly difficult to adhere
to with respect to correcting interpreting er-
rors. Presumably, the defendant requires an
interpreter because he does not speak English
or speaks it poorly. Therefore, it will usually
90 Id. at 1455. The court relied upon Bennett, 848 F.2d
1134; United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 740 (7th
Cir. 1988); United States v. Lim, 794 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1986).
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not be immediately apparent to the defendant
that the interpretation is inaccurate.9 Unless
the defendant's counsel happens to be bilin-
gual, he too will not be immediately aware that
an interpreter is committing errors. 992 Even if
defense counsel is bilingual, he cannot- and
should not-be expected to provide his client
with effective legal representation while si-
multaneously checking the interpreter's work
for mistakes0 As a practical matter, given the
unique disadvantages that the defendant and
his lawyer face with respect to identifying
interpreter errors, it may be impossible for
counsel to object in a timely manner. Further
complicating defense counsel's task, proceed-
ings that are conducted with the assistance of
a court interpreter are usually transcribed by
court reporters into English, as if the entire
proceeding were conducted in English. This
makes it very difficult to verify or discount al-
leged errors of interpretation on appeal.94
2. The "Fundamentally Unfair" Hurdle
In United States c.Joshi,95 the Eleventh
Circuit held that "[a]lthtough a continuous
word for word translation of the proceedings
will always pass constitutional muster, minor
deviations from this standard will not neces-
sarily contravene a defendant's constitutional
rights."9' In UnitedStates . Gonez,97 the Elev-
enth Circuit added that "defendants have no
constitutional 'right' to flawless, word for word
translations."O In Valadares, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit determined that the ultimate question is
whether any inadequacy in the interpretation
"made the trial fundamentally unfair."9
91 See Hovland, supra note 33, at 490.
92 See id.
93 See Bill Piatt, Attorney as Interpreter: A Return to
Babble, 20 N.M. L. Rev. 1 (1990).
94 Susan Berk-Selignson, The Bilingual Courtroom:
Court Interpreters in the Judicial Process, 200 (1990).
95 United States v. Joshi, 896 F.2d 1303 (11th Cir.
1990).
96 See id. at 1309.
97 United States v. Gomez, 908 F.2d 809 (11th Cir.
1990), cert denied, 498 U.S. 1035 (1991).
98 See id. at 811.
99 See United States v. Valladares, 871 F.2d 1564, 1566
(11th Cir. 1989), (citing United States v. Tapia, 631 F.2d 1207,
A number of subsequent court deci-
sions suggest that it is extremely difficult for
a defendant to show that an interpreter was
so deficient that his trial was "fundamentally
unfair." In United States e. Huang,,oo the Second
Circuit held that an uncertified court inter-
preter who summarized certain portions of
testimony was not fundamentally unfair, and
therefore in compliance with the Act. Simi-
larly, in United States v. Hernandez,"" the Third
Circuit determined that the inaccurate use of
a word or phrase nine times did not rise to the
level of unfairness. In United States v. Gomez,
the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the inter-
preter took "an unwarranted liberty with the
trial testimony" by translating the word "disco"
as "the Elks Lodge," which was the alleged
scene of a drug deal. Although the court had
no difficulty finding that the "interpreter's
conduct . . . resulted in some prejudice against
the appellant," it was not sufficient to render
the trial fundamentally unfair."' Similarly,
in UnitedStates v. Mata, 4, the Fourth Circuit
upheld a district court's ruling that even if
the interpreter had been. ineffective, his trial
was not fundamentally unfair, because the
defendant did not object to the interpretation
during trial, had at least a "passing" familiar-
ity with the English language, and, in any
case, there was overwhelming evidence of his
guilt.)
V. Conclusion
.Attorneys who hope to reverse the
decisions of trial judges because their client
was unable to fully understand and participate
in the court proceedings below are treading
in harsh realm. The standards of review that
appellate courts employ to determine whether
1210 (5th Cir. 1980)).
100 United States v. Huang, 960 F.2d 1128 (2d Cir. 1992).
101 United States v. Hernandez, 994 F. Supp. 627 (E.D.
Pa. 1998), aff'd without opinion, 248 F.3d 1131 (3d Cir. 2000).
102 United States v. Gomez, 908 F.2d 809, 811 (11th Cir.
1990).
103 See id. at 811.
104 United States v. Mata, No. 98-4843, 1999 WL
427570 (4th Cir. June 25, 1999).
105 See id. at *2-3.
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a defendant should have been provided with
a courtroom interpreter--- or a more qualified
courtroom interpreter--are so heavily bal-
anced in favor of upholding the trial court's
decision that only the most egregious sets of
facts are likely to prevail. In light of the dif-
ficulty of reversing adverse decisions due to
linguistic impairment on appeal, it is of para-
mount importance that attorneys who repre-
sent non-English speaking clients make timely
requests to increase the probability that their
clients will receive court-appointed interpret-
ers. Attorneys should be familiar with the
pitfalls that "sharing" or "borrowing" inter-
preters for court proceedings pose and should
be prepared to explain to the trial court why
and how this practice prejudices their clients'
rights. Attorneys should also be aware that not
all court interpreters are created equally. In-
terpreter error is a real problem, and appeals
requesting reversal because the non-English
speaking client received subpar access to the
court proceedings are unlikely to encounter a
sympathetic audience.
Finally, this article has examined a
number of cases from the California state
courts, which diverge substantially from fed-
eral case law. While the California cases can
be readily distinguished as decisions based
on interpretations of the California State
Constitution, rather than the United States
Constitution, the analyses that the California
state courts engaged in to justify their hold-
ings certainly could have been adopted by
the federal courts if they had chosen to do so.
While perhaps of little practical value to attor-
neys who do not practice in California's state
courts, the California cases present an intrigu-
ing window into what the Court Interpreters
Act, had it been interpreted differently by the
federal courts, might have become; and from
the optimist's vantage point, what the Court
Interpreters Act, with the nudge of some cre-
ative advocacy, might still one day accomplish.
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